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Introduction
In June 1994, Belarus held its first presidential 
election as mandated by the post-Soviet Constitution 
that had been adopted earlier that same year. In the 
first round of the election no candidate received more 
than 50% of the vote, but in the runoff in July, 
Alyaksander Lukashenka, a former state farm chairman 
from the Shklou district, Mahileu province, emerged as 
the clear winner over former prime minister 
Vyachaslau Kebich. The presidency of Lukashenka 
has been eventful and controversial. Most notably in 
the summer of 1996, when Belarus experienced a 
constitutional crisis and the president decided to 
organize a referendum on enhancing presidential 
powers while reducing those of the parliament and 
Constitutional Court. The referendum was duly held in 
November 1996. Although the electorate strongly 
supported all of Lukashenka’s propositions, observers 
from both the West and the opposition believed the 
results to have been falsified. By the end of the year, 
the results of the referendum were made legally binding 
through amendments to the 1994 Constitution and at 
the same time the president declared his intention to 
start his term of office over, from the date of the 
referendum. Neither the West nor the Belarusian 
opposition has recognized the validity of this process 
and thus the question arose of what would happen in 
the country when the original five-year term of office 
for the president expired, on 20 July 1999.
The Pre-Election Campaign
In January the 13th Session of the Supreme Soviet, 
officially dissolved by the president in late 1996, but 
which has continued to hold sessions and is still 
chaired by Semyon Sharetsky, formed a Central 
Electoral Commission. On 16 January, Decree No. 7 
of the Central Electoral Commission announced its 
intention to hold a presidential election on 16 May, to 
be organized by the Commission under Viktar
Hanchar.1 The process of registering candidates and 
gathering a minimum of 100,000 signatures was 
identical to that of 1994 and followed the 1994 
Constitution. The leaders of the opposition had one 
common goal, namely to mount an assault on President 
Lukashenka, noting that he had already been in power 
for five years and focusing on the sharp deterioration of 
living standards in that period. In turn, the opposition 
also had to make the case that it was capable of 
bringing about an improvement of the economic 
situation.
Among the leading players in this process, however, 
the goals varied. Hanchar was anxious to improve his 
standing among the electorate by creating an image of 
a man of great organizational ability who at the same 
time was selfless in his motives. Hanchar also wished 
to make political inroads into two power sectors, in 
order to establish a "party of the new power" that 
would support his political ambitions. These two 
sectors were the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), long 
recognized as the principal opposition party of Belarus, 
and part of the Lukashenka nomenklatura, which fears 
the implications of a change in the power structure and 
was perceived as willing to make compromises. 
Zyanon Paznyak, the leader of the BPF, has been living 
in exile since 1996, officially as a refugee in the United 
States but in fact he resides mainly in Poland. Paznyak, 
though assured of loyal support from his followers, was 
thus distanced from events in his homeland. 
Nonetheless, he decided to allow himself to be a 
presidential candidate (as he was also in 1994) to 
improve his standing in his native country and to attract 
more funding for his party.
Other potential candidates appeared briefly. 
Henadz Karpenka, one of the leaders of the Congress 
of Democratic Forces held in Minsk in late January and
'See, for example, Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, 15 
February 1999, p. 1.
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a prominent member of the United Civic Party, held the 
view that the opposition elections would push the 
president into holding his own elections later in 1999; 
at that time, he intended to allow himself to be 
nominated as a rival. Moreover, Karpenka believed 
that Hanchar would use the May election to conduct 
various political tricks that would shed an unfavorable 
light on the process in the eyes of the electorate. Boris 
Berezovsky, then secretary of the CIS and once an 
important power broker in Russia, also played a part in 
the Belarusian campaign by supporting the candidacy 
of Chyhir. This move can be perceived as a reaction by 
Berezovsky to Lukashenka’s outspoken opposition to 
the CIS while it remained under Berezovsky's 
leadership. Other possible candidates included S. 
Domash, Syarhey Haydukevich, N. Statkevich, and S. 
Kalyakin.
Domash proposed that several political leaders 
should meet and decide on a candidate to run in the 
elections, ostensibly with the hope that he personally 
would be that candidate. He gave the Minsk leaders an 
ultimatum that if they failed to form a united front, then 
the union of democratic forces would commence not in 
Minsk, but in his home base of Hrodna. Gennadiy 
Grushevoy (Henadz Hrushavy), the Chairman of the 
Belarusian Charitable Fund "For the Children of 
Chernobyl," the largest locally administered NGO in 
Belarus, elected not to run because of fears for his 
physical safety, but he considered a role as an organizer 
of a petition to gather signatures in support of a 
referendum on the question: Do you support the 
integration of Belarus into the European Union? All 
the potential candidates began the campaign with 
certain goals vis-a-vis the electorate: to preserve the 
voters' faith in them; to undermine the support of the 
electors for their rivals; and to attract apolitical voters.
The Position of President Lukashenka
During the election campaign and especially at the 
initial stages, Lukashenka competed with the 
opposition candidates for the support of the electorate. 
He sought to present an image of a president who fights 
against corruption and is the servant of the people. His 
opponents, meanwhile, were depicted as people who 
would side with the Western powers, who were corrupt 
and self-serving, and for whom power and money took 
precedence over the interests of the people. His 
speeches portrayed the opposition leaders as children. 
Lukashenka’s main weakness was the sharp decline in 
the economy that had taken place since the fall of 1998.
The government laid the blame for the dramatic decline 
in the Belarusian standard of living first on Russian 
criminal elements, followed by local ministers and 
factory managers, the ramifications of the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster, and the opposition for "slandering" 
the regime in the West, with the result that Belarusian 
products could no longer find markets abroad.
During the election campaign, Lukashenka had 
several positive resources. He possessed the material 
assets of the state, control over the media, the ability to 
obtain information from opposition centers, and not 
least his own remarkable oratory and ability to discern 
the mood of the public. How popular is the president? 
Clearly, he is more popular and trusted by the older 
generation. This is evident from polls conducted by the 
Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies over the five years of the Lukashenka 
presidency (ending in March 1999), which show a 
pattern that is virtually unchanged, but for a slight fall 
in support for the president in 1999. Thus to the 
question: If the presidential elections were held 
tomorrow, whom would you choose as the candidate? 
(only one politician could be named), 75% of those 
over the age of 55 selected Lukashenka, 36.4% in the 
age group 16-19, and only 24.3% between the ages of 
25-29. In the over 55 category two years ago, however, 
the corresponding figure was 81.8%.2 3
A survey conducted by the organization Novak, led 
by Andrey Vardamatsky, polled 1,094 Belarusians 
between 26 April and 3 May 1999 on the question: 
How do you appraise well known politicians?- 
allowing for both positive and negative responses. In 
the positive category, Lukashenka received 47.5%, 
followed by Jacques Chirac with 25.1%, Slobodan 
Milosevic with 17.9%, and Boris Yeltsin and Bill 
Clinton came at the bottom of the list with 12.3% and 
11.4% respectively. The negative voting saw the same 
two world leaders well ahead of the field with 52.2% 
and 52.1%, Milosevic with 35.1%, and Lukashenka 
with 30%? The survey demonstrates two factors: first, 
Lukashenka remains the most popular politician within 
Belarus, but second, that support may be lukewarm and 
his negative ratings are quite high. Moreover, the 
obvious lack of faith in Yeltsin may reflect badly on 
Lukashenka’s initiatives to form a union with Russia. 
Lukashenka’s ratings in Minsk have consistently been
2Belarus Today, 4 May 1999.
3Naviny, 18 May 1999, p. 3.
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up to ten percentage points lower than those in Belarus 
as a whole. Lukashenka, then, had significant positive 
forces at his disposal during the campaign.
On the negative side, he faced the process of the 
continual decline in living standards. In a survey 
published in the newspaper Naviny (25 May 1999), in 
an article entitled "How We Live," it was noted that 
63% of the electorate consider that the economy of 
Belarus is "weak" or "very weak." In the early years of 
his presidency Lukashenka could successfully divert 
attention for economic problems to the government of 
his predecessors, Stanislau Shushkevich (1991 to 
January 1994) and Vyachaslau Kebich (January-June 
1994). After five years in power, however, and with 
enhanced authority since November 1996 in what is 
virtually a presidential state, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to avoid responsibility for Belarus's decline in 
living standards. By May 1999, according to a survey 
published in an opposition newspaper, the negative 
vote exceeded the positive (2.5 million to 1.5 million 
out of 7 million voters).4
The Opposition Campaign
The opposition campaign was well funded. 
Hanchar, as the chairman of the CEC, received about 
$250,000 in funds, with potential for as much as $5 
million (though as will be observed, funding began to 
dry up as a result of internal disputes). It received 
sympathy from Russian media sources, which 
publicized the opposition campaign within Belarus. 
The election campaign was helped by a strong 
organizational team, the tacit support of the West, 
positive backing from some Russian leaders, and by the 
widespread structure of the BPF in all regions of 
Belarus. Ultimately, only two candidates took part in 
the campaign: Mikhail Chyhir, a former prime minister 
under Lukashenka; and Zyanon Paznyak, chairman of 
the BPF. A third group under Karpenka, supported by 
the Charter-97 group under the leadership of 
Alyaksander Sannikau, intended to mount a campaign 
later in the year against Lukashenka. This plan was 
ended abruptly with Karpenka’s untimely death on 6 
April.5 *
4 Oleg Manaev, writing in the newspaper Narodnaya
Volya, 21 May 1999. The figures, however, seem suspect and the 
likelihood is that they pertained only to a certain phase of the election 
campaign.
sAn oributary of Karpenka appeared in Belorusskaya 
delovaya gazeta, 7 April 1999, p. 1.
Chyhir is a poor public speaker; indeed, his 
speeches attract ridicule rather than attention. In the 
election campaign he tried to present himself as a man 
of organizational ability who could reverse the trends 
in the economy. He advocated minimum wages of 
$100 a month (in May 1999 they were on average 
about $34) and pensions of $50 a month. He had the 
support initially of the powerful former Minister of 
Internal Affairs Yuri Zakharenka and vowed to bring 
criminal charges against Lukashenka for corruption. 
His campaign thus focused on his creativity and 
initiative, and at the same time his ability to be a strong 
leader. Paznyak also declared his intention to form 
people's tribunals to investigate issues such as 
corruption, political repression, and Chernobyl-related 
problems. Paznyak and the BPF have also advocated 
closer contacts with Europe, as opposed to Russia, and 
ultimately the integration of Belarus into the European 
Union.
Paznyak, however, was limited by several factors. 
His directions to his subordinates came by facsimile 
from Poland, since he never crossed the border into 
Belarus. Eventually these constant faxes elicited 
laughter and irritation. In short, it proved impossible 
for Paznyak to obtain an accurate picture of what was 
happening in the campaign. His rating among the 
majority of voters remained negative, thanks in part to 
the regime's depiction of him and his family as 
"fascists" (despite the fact that he was born only in 
1944 and that his father perished at the hands of 
Fascists during the war). His flight to the United States 
in 1996 was equated with cowardice by some voters, 
particularly when contrasted with those imprisoned 
recently in Belarus-eventually including Chyhir 
himself.
The Decline of Lukashenka
The opposition election placed reliance on the hope 
that as a result of the campaign, the electoral rating of 
Lukashenka would begin to fall significantly. Focus 
was also placed on the "lawlessness" of the regime. 
Lukashenka, in turn, emphasized his role as “protector” 
of Belarusians against threats from the West. This role 
could be said to have begun with the evictions of 
Western ambassadors from their residences at the 
Drazdy complex outside Minsk in June 1998. He has 
frequently changed his cabinet, illustrating his role as 
a leader who is prepared to develop new initiatives. In 
addition, however, his initial approach to the election 
was to denounce the opposition for trying to seize
13
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power, using as his instrument the State Prosecutor. 
This accusation undermined the credibility of the 
president among the public. In the eyes of the voters, 
the president appeared weak and even frightened, 
whereas the opposition seemed to have taken the 
initiative. After mass protests of workers in November 
1998 in Salihorsk and Minsk, Lukashenka offered to 
give up his portfolio as president if the workers and 
collective farmers felt the need to punish him. This 
event was an earlier manifestation of the president's 
fear of losing power.
In turn, the policy of repressing opponents had the 
reverse effect to what was intended. Hanchar was 
summoned to the office of the KGB and warned not to 
continue the election campaign. Members of his 
committee were detained and then Hanchar himself was 
arrested in early March and jailed for ten days, and then 
force-fed after declaring a hunger strike. These events 
were highlighted on Russian Television, which is 
accessible to the vast majority of Belarusian residents, 
in addition to opposition newspapers. Hanchar became 
something of a hero to Belarusians, particularly during 
the hunger strike. He was seen as a man who was not 
even running as a candidate but was prepared to 
sacrifice himself for the goal of free elections. 
Lukashenka's credibility, on the other hand, continued 
to dissipate. The Russian media at this stage of the 
campaign began to highlight the activities of Chyhir 
and Hanchar, causing Paznyak to accuse Chyhir of 
being Moscow's protege. The government also 
threatened to close six opposition newspapers that 
continued to advertise the date of the elections.
The arrests and detentions, first of Hanchar for 
holding an unsanctioned meeting, and then Chyhir on 
31 March, on a trumped-up charge of transferring $1 
million to a company in Canada while chairman of the 
board of the Belahrodprombank, created martyrs of 
these two opposition leaders. On 8 April Chyhir was 
charged with grand larceny and jailed for three months, 
thereby ensuring that he would be absent from the 
remainder of the presidential campaign.6 On 15 April 
the authorities prevented a press conference to have 
been held by Hanchar by turning off electricity and 
blocking off the entrance to the building. On 7 May, 
Zakharenka disappeared in the vicinity of his own
6 RFE/RL Newsline Daily Digest, 9 April 1999.
apartment building and has not been seen since.7 Each 
government action designed to thwart the elections and 
punish the candidates and organizers undermined its 
prestige. For a brief period it appeared that not only 
would the elections be conducted successfully, but that 
the fact of their being held at all constituted a serious 
threat to the Lukashenka presidency. Lukashenka's 
over-reaction and brute-force tactics appeared crude 
and unnecessary and demonstrated, above all, his 
trepidation at the turn of events. The first stage of the 
election campaign was thus a sweeping success for the 
opposition.
The Rise of Lukashenka
At this stage, Lukashenka's supporters in 
government came to his aid. Both Prime Minister 
Syarhey Linh and head of the presidential 
administration Mikhail Myasnikovich played prominent 
roles. Gradually during the campaign Lukashenka 
reestablished his position as a powerful and all- 
pervasive leader, while Linh receded into the 
background. Moreover, Linh was held responsible for 
the government’s poor economic performance. 
Lukashenka was directly assisted in this transition by 
the two opposition candidates themselves, Chyhir and 
Paznyak, as the election campaign took on a bitter hue. 
Even prior to his arrest, Chyhir mounted an attack on 
Paznyak, while shortly afterward the latter tried to have 
Chyhir's wife Yulia and her colleague Tatsyana Vanina 
expelled from the Soym (leadership body) of the BPF. 
A direct confrontation occurred between the BPF 
leader and Yulia Chyhir that served to discredit both 
presidential candidates and discouraged potential 
sponsors from investing further funds in the two 
opposition campaigns. Indeed, the critique of Paznyak 
in the democratic newspaper Svobodtiye novosti (23-30 
April 1999) exceeded in its venom anything directed 
formerly against President Lukashenka.
A second event played an important role in the 
change of fortunes for the president, namely NATO's
7 Disappearances of Lukashenka’s opponents are 
becoming increasingly common in Belarus. The most notorious case 
is that of former chairperson of the National Bank, Tamara 
Vinnikava, who had been under house arrest for over two years and 
“disappeared” on the night of 7-8 April. Her Russian lawyer, Garri 
Pogonyaylo, believes taht she may have been moved to a secret 
location to keep her concealed from pubic view. Others speculate that 




bombing attack on Yugoslavia. Lukashenka used 
"NATO aggression" as a means to undermine the 
campaigns of Paznyak and Chyhir. The mass media 
began to portray the president in several ways: as a man 
fearless of NATO attacks, who was willing to fly to 
Yugoslavia to meet with Milosevic in mid-April, 
despite there being no guarantees of his safety; as an 
integrator working toward the union of Russia, Belarus, 
and even Yugoslavia; and as a peacemaker, adopting 
the principles of protection of his citizens from 
aggression. Lukashenka’s flight to Yugoslavia had two 
other consequences. First, it raised the possibility of 
the “accidental" removal of the president from the 
political scene by his flying through a war zone. 
Second, it presented to the world television pictures of 
Lukashenka and Milosevic as close friends. This 
development heightened the anti-western image of 
Lukashenka but it also served to perpetuate the view of 
Lukashenka as a ruthless politician who was willing to 
eliminate his enemies (such as Zakharenka and Tamara 
Vinnikava) and was on cordial terms with tyrants 
(Milosevic).
At this same time the death of Karpenka led to 
further ramifications for Chyhir’s campaign. In several 
regional newspapers, articles appeared that accused 
former members of Karpenka's executive committee of 
deserting to Chyhir, a fact that Karpenka had 
considered a personal misfortune. Obituaries of 
Karpenka in the newspaper Naviny and other BPF 
publications dwelled on this event. One such article, 
entitled "Traitors in the camp of
Chyhir," was even broadcast on radio and 
television. As Chyhir’s ratings began to fall, articles 
appeared in the mass circulation daily Sovetskaya 
Belorussiya creating an image of Lukashenka as a 
leader of genius. While Sovetskaya Belorussiya has 
long been a sycophantic newspaper in the president’s 
camp, the timing of the new eulogies was significant. 
Ultimately, therefore, the death of Karpenka, which 
might have united the opposition, only divided it 
further, while permitting the president to solidify his 
own backing.
A slight setback for Lukashenka occurred with the 
visit to Minsk of former Soviet president Mikhail 
Gorbachev on 14-15 April to participate in an 
international round-table on the theme "Russia and 
Belarus in the New Europe."8 Lukashenka made a point
of appearing in public with Gorbachev, and made the 
unsolicited comment-to the delight of the BPF-that 
"we are all children of Gorbachev." Opinions of 
Gorbachev among the electorate are uniformly low. He 
is associated less with the ending of a totalitarian 
regime than as the man who destroyed the Soviet 
Union, in which Belarus had thrived, and as the man 
responsible for several bloody conflicts that ensued. 
The liberal opposition could thus present Lukashenka 
as a second Gorbachev, more devoted to chatter than 
any authentic reform. However, attention was diverted 
from this "electoral slip" of Lukashenka by a profound 
rift that occurred between Paznyak and Hanchar over 
the way in which the election was to be conducted.
For Hanchar, the organization of the elections was 
a formidable task. There were no official polling 
stations available and it appeared impossible to hold 
valid elections-i.e., in which at least 50% of the 
electorate participated-unless some other means were 
devised. His solution was to have members of the 
Central Electoral Commission carry the ballot boxes 
from one apartment building to another so that votes 
could be collected. This process necessitated the 
beginning of voting on 6 May rather than the official 
polling day of 16 May. Paznyak, who had already 
accused the Chyhir camp of falsifying signatures for its 
candidate's original registration, reacted with fury to 
this change of procedure. He called on the electorate 
to boycott the "pre-election" voting and accused 
Hanchar of arbitrarily overriding the law in ways 
similar to those used by the president in the November 
1996' referendum.9 Further, on 11 May, Paznyak 
ordered those BPF members on the Central Electoral 
Commission to resign their posts and on 13 May, he 
declared that he would withdraw his own candidacy 
from the election.
In taking this stance, Paznyak split his own camp. 
Some of his deputies (S. Papkau, A. Krivorot) began 
telephoning regions and insisting that BPF members 
leave the commissions, communicating both with the 
headquarters of the BPF and with Hanchar. Another 
group felt that Paznyak had sabotaged the efforts of the 
opposition to hold the elections and began to assess the 
actions of their leader as treacherous. Deputy chairman 
Yuri Khadyka considered that Paznyak’s action had 
destroyed the image of the BPF as a democratic party 
and claimed that Paznyak was using the campaign for
o
Belorusskaya gazeta, 17 April 1999, p. 4. 9See, for example, Belarus Today, 11 May 1999.
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self-promotion rather than to promote the goals of his 
party and democracy.10 BPF leaders meanwhile held 
several press conferences that accused Hanchar of 
falsifying the election returns while members of the 
rank-and-file could only perceive such actions as 
furthering the interests of the Lukashenka government. 
Within the leadership of the BPF some members began 
to consider the removal of Paznyak as leader. The 13th 
Session of the Supreme Soviet, led by Sharetsky, 
rejected Paznyak's claims and declared that the voting 
procedure was legitimate. The main issue hitherto-the 
power and authority of Lukashenka-had been 
forgotten.
After the Elections
By the morning of 15 May the CEC reported that 
3.6 million Belarusians had cast their votes, 
representing 48.7% of the electorate.11 Four days later, 
a spokesperson for the Central Election Commission, 
Alyaksander Koktysh, announced that by the end of the 
campaign, over 4 million people had taken part in 
voting, or 53.1 % of eligible voters. In announcing such 
figures, the CEC claimed that the elections had been a 
success. Neither Koktysh nor Hanchar provided a 
breakdown of votes for individual candidates, however. 
Moreover, the alleged size of the turnout seemed very 
unlikely to most observers. In Minsk it was difficult to 
find people who had actually voted, and on 16 May, 
many potential voters had no idea where to vote. Ballot 
stations included the shell of an old bus in a Minsk 
suburb, for example. The announcements of 15 and 19 
May, therefore, more than any other events of the 
tumultuous campaign, destroyed the faith of the 
opposition in Hanchar, as the chief organizer of the 
elections. Those in opposition were completely 
disillusioned by what appeared to them to be the 
falsification of the election results. Paznyak again 
overreacted by blaming Chyhir who was declared to be 
relaxing under comfortable conditions in prison!
Between the two camps a new battle commenced 
over the votes for the individual candidates. A BPF 
version of the results appeared on the Internet, and 
maintained that Paznyak had received 2.5 million votes 
to Chyhir’s 1.5 million. Paradoxically, if correct, this 
would signify that most BPF members and
10 Yuriy Khodyko, “BNF ne ozero dlya Nartsissa,” 
Naviny, 18 May 1999, p. 3.
11 Belorusskaya gazeta, 17 May 1999, p. 6.
sympathizers had ignored Paznyak's demand that they 
boycott the elections. The newspaper Pagonya (20 
May 1999) declared that Paznyak had received almost 
500,000 votes in the Hrodna region alone. Other 
sources indicated a victory for Chyhir. Under these 
circumstances Lukashenka announced on television 
that the elections would not lead to a change of 
government. Though the president's ratings had fallen 
slightly as a result of the campaign, those of Paznyak 
and Hanchar had suffered a catastrophic decline. 
Chyhir's ratings were more stable since a portion of the 
electorate was resolutely opposed to his continuing 
detainment in jail.
Where do these events leave Sharetsky and 
Hanchar? For Sharetsky's own presidential ambitions 
it was useful that during the opposition presidential 
elections no candidate was elected. Hanchar, on the 
other hand, may hope that even negative publicity is 
good publicity in terms of keeping his name in the 
limelight. In the next stage of the presidential 
elections, which Sharetsky has declared his intention to 
hold, Hanchar plans to advance his nomination as a 
candidate for the presidency. His place as chairman of 
the CEC will be taken by Tarazevich, while in the 
background the real authority may be Boris Gyunter, a 
CEC secretary. Two years ago Sharetsky and Hanchar 
conducted an ideological war against one another, but 
recently the two have been in close contact and have 
held discussions on various issues. Hanchar has used 
the departure of numerous BPF members from the 
regional electoral commissions to ensure that these 
posts are filled with his own supporters. Hanchar, in 
short, is hardly fulfilling the role of a democratic or 
unselfish statesman. The question in the minds of the 
BPF, the OSCE, and other observers of the situation in 
Belarus is: How will Sharetsky respond to the 
machinations of Hanchar? Are they in the same camp? 
Will they continue to work together?12
12 Since this article went to press, both politicians have 
been removed, temporarily or otherwise, from the Minsk political 
scene. On 20 July, fearing imminent arrest, Sharetsky fled to Vilnius, 
Lithuania, where he remained as of the end of September. See 
RFE/RL Newsline, Part 11, 26 July 1999. On 16-17 September, 
Hanchar “disappeared” not far from his apartment and has not been 
in Minsk since. The authorities have claimed that he has left 
Belarus; other sources, including the OSCE and the US Department 
of State, suspecting foul play, have demanded an explanation from 
the authorities. See The Jamestown Foundation Monitor Daily 
Report, 23 September 1999.
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Sharetsky received a message from L. Barshcheuski 
and A. Krivorot, deputy chairman and secretary of the 
BPF respectively, on 30 May outlining the alleged 
falsification of the election results by Hanchar. At 
stake was the potential support of both the BPF and 
OSCE for Sharetsky and the 13lh Session of the 
Supreme Soviet. On 16 May, at an OSCE meeting 
attended by Hanchar, Tarazevich, Gyunter and with 
Adrian Severin of the OSCE, Hanchar accused other 
OSCE representatives of providing an unobjective 
appraisal of the election campaign in Belarus. For his 
part, Severin anticipated that there were two possible 
scenarios for Belarus after 20 July. In the first, 
Sharetsky would assume the presidency after 20 July, 
supported by the EU and the United States, who would 
put pressure on Lukashenka to agree to new elections 
for president later in the year. Lukashenka and the 
opposition could then hold discussions (such 
discussions failed to get off the ground in 1997) and 
create a united commission for the election of president 
that would also incorporate the CEC. Elections would 
then occur under the control of international observers.
In Severin's second variant, Sharetsky would 
assume the presidency but Lukashenka would refuse 
the overtures of the West and refuse to hold elections. 
Then the OSCE would offer its own version of a 
presidential election in which only the opposition 
forces would participate. The OSCE also stressed the 
importance of continued pressure of the IMF and 
EBRD on Russia through the assignment of credits. 
Severin maintained that the departure of Primakov as 
Russian premier was linked to pressure on Yeltsin on 
the part of the United States. In turn, Russia would put 
pressure on Lukashenka to hold new elections this year 
for the presidency. However, the views of Western 
statesmen clearly may vary and there has been 
supposition that some leaders of the US government 
are not averse to seeing a continuation of the 
Lukashenka presidency, providing that it offers stability 
in the republic rather than a situation closer to civil war 
between the various parties.
The Belarusian Popular Front
An intensive debate within the BPF occurred after 
the election among those leaders who favor the 
replacement of Paznyak. The likely time for such an 
event was the summer Congress of the party 
(commencing 31 July). At the time of writing the 
potential candidates for BPF Chair were Viktor 
Ivashkevich and Vintsuk Vechorka. Khadyka was also
considering the position, particularly as Paznyak had 
openly demanded his removal from the deputy 
chairmanship. Another deputy chairman, Lyavon 
Barshcheuski, was to maintain his position of loyalty to 
Paznyak as long as the party did not submit itself to the 
re-registration procedures demanded by the 
government. If it was reregistered then Barshcheuski 
would support the replacement of Paznyak. As far as 
the beleaguered chair is concerned, there are two 
conflicting analyses. The first notes that Paznyak has 
a negative image among voters, most of whom perceive 
him as a fascist or an aggressive nationalist. The rating 
of Paznyak has collapsed and has no potential to rise, 
and thus Paznyak has no chance of succeeding against 
a popular figure such as Lukashenka, particularly when 
the incumbent president has all the machinery of the 
government at his disposal.
The alternative deduction, however, is that despite 
his negative qualities, Paznyak has positive potential as 
a candidate. He is well known and his name is 
practically synonymous with the BPF. If Paznyak were 
replaced, his successor would be unknown, and lacking 
adequate access to the mass media he would find it 
impossible to unravel the hard core of support for 
Lukashenka. Further, Paznyak is idolized by a section 
of the BPF, thus any attempt to replace him would 
cause a deep rift within the party. In the minds of 
supporters therefore, the removal of Paznyak would 
likely mean the extinction of the BPF as a political 
force. At the very least, however, Paznyak's actions 
during the campaign made him appear foolish to many 
voters.
The Future
Lukashenka can take heart from the failure of the 
opposition election campaign, despite making some 
elementary blunders at the outset by adopting heavy- 
handed tactics. The electoral ratings for all his rivals 
for the presidency have either plummeted (as in the 
case of Paznyak and Hanchar) or remain very low 
(Domash, Grushevoy, Sharetsky, Chyhir, Kalyakin, 
Haydukevich). The pro-Western platforms of leaders 
of the democratic opposition were deeply undercut by 
the NATO attack on Yugoslavia and even with the 
ending of this conflict may take several months to 
recover from these events. The president currently has 
a unique opportunity to combine new presidential 
elections with a referendum question that could be 
phrased to cover the spectrum of Europe and the world: 
Do you support the union of Belarus and Russia with
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the integration of Belarus into European and world 
society? This question would solidify the electoral 
program of Lukashenka and undercut the platform of 
opposition leaders who choose to oppose him.
The danger for Lukashenka comes from several 
quarters. Retired servicemen, for example, including 
those from Russia, voted solidly for Paznyak in the 
election (reportedly around 52% in Lida, the main 
military base). The trade unions are increasingly active 
and anti-government, though they in turn are 
experiencing a leadership struggle and competing for 
foreign funds. Catholics, the majority of whom live in 
the Hrodna region, are alienated from the Lukashenka 
government and a president self-described as an 
"Orthodox atheist." Lastly, the country is in a deep 
economic recession with no prospects for improvement 
in the near future. The president, as in the past, will 
need to make a distinction between a presidency which 
has as its main motivational factor the needs and 
interests of the people and a government composed, 
mainly, of incompetent bureaucrats. Significant 
changes in the Cabinet can thus be anticipated, and 
Prime Minister Linh's position must be considered very 
insecure. Ultimately Lukashenka must circumvent the 
fundamental question on the lips of voters: Who is to 
blame for the collapse of living standards?
Lukashenka, then, faces significant problems, but 
they pale beside those of an opposition whose tactics 
during the election have caused bewilderment among a 
population slowly becoming accustomed to the loss of 
Karpenka, one of the greatest forces for unity in the 
opposition. Sharetsky's direct association with the 
activities of Hanchar has done little to promote faith 
internationally in the Supreme Soviet of the 13th 
session. Paznyak's tactics, hectoring, and high-
handedness from his rostrum abroad have cost him 
support and already elicited significant divisions within 
the BPF. Chyhir has little charisma and would be 
unlikely to succeed in a direct competition with 
Lukashenka. He has benefited from his imprisonment, 
which has brought protests both within and outside 
Belarus, but he would not pose a serious challenge 
without support from the BPF or Trade Unions, neither 
of which is likely to be forthcoming. Under these 
circumstances, Lukashenka has little to lose from 
calling new presidential elections that can be held
under international scrutiny.13 In so doing he may even 
be able to retain his revised Constitution and the 
revamped parliament and upper house. He will have 
satisfied the demands of the OSCE and can reopen a 
dialogue with the West as an alternative to the abortive 
discussions with Russia to bring reality to the Russia- 
Belarus Union.
The presidential elections held in May 1999 have 
thus provided a new opportunity for Lukashenka both 
to consolidate his power and take his place as a leader 
in the new Europe. For the democratic opposition, long 
struggling to make its voice heard in the West, it is 
difficult to imagine what greater disaster could have 
befallen it.
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